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Abstract
The difficulty of making decisions in end of life is the subject of these reflections through 
two clinical cases. We considered the question of palliative sedation for existential 
distress through a phenomenological approach, focusing the relationship between a 
patient’s clinical history and the reactions of the care team to the existential distress of 
the patients. We chose to introduce a concept, dynamic projective identifications, which 
is a powerful mechanism for communication between human beings. The hypothesis 
is that projective identification works as a powerful mechanism of emotional contagion 
between people facing death, families, and their health workers. In the cases, however, 
the use of this therapeutic tool is not oriented to provide psychotherapeutic methods of 
supporting dying patients but to sustain the awareness of the care team in the decision-
making process. The psychological pressure on the care team may lead physicians to act 
considering “what you already know”. Being aware of these mechanisms can help physi-
cians to understand the phenomena that are happening. Even if palliative sedation is the 
best therapy, the care team must clarify the meaning of the projective identification and 
enter them into the flow of communication with the patients and their families.
Keywords: palliative sedation terminal, existential distress, end-of-life making decision, 
projective identifications, death
1. Introduction
The confrontation with impending death triggers emotional reactions (e.g., feelings of 
grief, sadness, despair, anxiety, loss and loneliness, etc.), some of which are adaptive 
responses to preparatory grief [1]. Many patients are able to achieve acceptance of their 
© 2017 The Author(s). Licensee InTech. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
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illness and its prognosis, but each patient brings his/her own characteristic mode of cop-
ing and an array of strengths and vulnerabilities to the experience of a terminal illness. 
Systematic psychological assessment allows the clinician to support effective coping 
mechanisms and to identify persons at risk of experiencing high levels of difficulty during 
their illness [2]. Demoralization syndrome is an important clinical entity that is defined 
by the presence of pathological symptoms in the areas of mood, hope, and subjective 
competence. It is a personal experience of not coping with attacks on one’s self efficacy 
and esteem [3]. In cancer patients, this process is sometimes described as “existential 
distress” [4], but it also occurs within the traditional psychiatric, and it is a risk factor 
for the manifestation of psychopathology. Demoralization is a spectrum that starts with 
subjective incompetence and non-pathological distress, and it can transition into helpless-
ness, which sometimes grows into hopelessness. When it endures, it can be recognized 
as a syndrome that causes significant impairment in important areas of functioning [5]. 
Although some symptoms of demoralization are also expressed in existential distress at 
the end of life (feeling of apprehension, panic, threat, feeling of incompetence, of shame, 
impotence, aloneness, isolation, despair, etc.), existential distress manifests the experi-
ence of existential suffering in the context of an individual’s confrontation with a specific 
stage of the dying process. Some people with certain personality traits, disadvantaged 
socioeconomic situations, or trauma histories in childhood might experience long-stand-
ing existential suffering (isolation, loss of dignity, meaninglessness, fear, etc.). Existential 
distress specifically develops as the result of facing one's impending death and is different 
from other reactions to end of life. In addition, existential distress must be distinguished 
from major depressive episodes, anxiety disorders, and delirium [6]. We refer to the defi-
nition article of Schuman-Olivier et al. ([7], p. 340) for definition and differential diagnosis 
from other psychiatric disorders. The authors have proposed a classification of existential 
distress based on the temporal context of the dying process: acute, subacute, and chronic 
are the general categories that focus on a person’s proximity to likely death (imminent for 
acute and subacute, or <2 weeks, not imminent but life-threatening for chronic). We agree 
that the time available until death or loss  functioning and a patient’s baseline functional 
capacity to engage in the logistics of a therapeutic relationship are clear parameters to 
suggest therapeutic approaches (psychotherapy, psychopharmacological intervention up 
to palliative sedation) to clinicians and to help create a reliable decision-making language.
The questions of when and how to intervene with palliative sedation therapy (PST) are 
related to the concept of defining a refractory symptom [8]. Even if procedural guidelines for 
PST [9, 10] help physicians and care teams through the decision-making process and make 
them more comfortable to respond to physical sufferance, when their patients experienced 
any psychological symptom, physicians more frequently reported an emotional pressure [11]. 
Individual clinician bias, emotional exhaustion, or burnout can influence the decision-making 
process [12] as well as cultural, social, and ethical conditioning [13].
Therefore, the goal, on one hand, is to understand the peculiar suffering of patients (and their 
families) and, on the other hand, to analyze the psychological responses of the care team 
toward the suffering of a particular patient.
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Through two narratives, we propose the physicians’ work to comprehend the context (the 
patient’s clinical history) in which the phenomenon of existential distress appears and make 
an effort to be aware of the projective identifications ([14], pp. 37–74). We refer to mostly raw 
emotion, which is unfiltered by the reflective function of thought, or proto-emotional and 
sensory elements [15] that bridge the relationship between the patient and the care provider 
(family, physicians, and care team).
The purpose of this contagion is that one can feel and experience what another person experi-
ences, even bodily sensations and perceptions (embodiment), through a total affective com-
munication process. If a care team is not trained to contain the projective identifications or is 
overwhelmed by them, it will likely unconsciously react, adding another disturbance to the 
patient, in what has been termed “projective counter identification” (in [14] p. 43, [16]).
Two cases are presented of hospice patients who manifest symptoms of existential distress 
during the last days of life. Because of the rapid progression of their diseases, it was not pos-
sible to identify a therapeutic space for the patients to undergo routine psychotherapeutic and 
psychosocial approaches that are useful for patients with advanced life-threatening illness. 
Both patients experienced acute and subacute existential distress. In these clinical examples, 
we highlight the importance of clarifying the projective identifications and entering them into 
the flow of communication with the health care providers not to make hasty decisions and to 
tolerate the wait to ensure understanding of each incoherent or bizarre phenomenon before 
defining it as a symptom requiring treatment. Particularly in cases in which it is difficult to 
establish the refractoriness of a symptom, or when PST seemed to be appropriate for psycho-
logical distress, the care team is helped by a psychological team to reflect and recognize PST 
as a potential “counterphobic defense to treat.”
The authors have adopted a phenomenological approach to study the case focusing on the 
relationship between the clinical history elements (symptoms, reaction to changes in therapy, 
biographical context, emotional, and behavioral relationships with significant others) and the 
countertransference reactions of care teams.
The countertransference refers in these cases to the use of emotions, images, thoughts, etc., 
within the care team, that are stimulated by what the patient and family live and feel [17, 18]. 
The survey method is qualitative and descriptive. Objective parameters (vital signs, pain and 
other symptoms, etc.) are noted in the diary, as well as the steps of the decision-making pro-
cess, described in narrative form from the interviews with the patient and family.
The hospice team has a psychologist who specializes in psycho-oncology and three physi-
cians with experience in palliative care. One of the physicians has also been a dance move-
ment therapist since 2006 and a psychotherapist with training in expressive therapies. She 
is the narrator of the case histories reported here. The narrative approach is one method of 
revealing the intensity of end-of-life meetings and developing awareness reflection [19].
In these cases, the focus was on observing the events from a medical point of view, with pre-
cise job roles within the care team (i.e., observing from the perspective of "from the inside"), 
as well as observing through psychotherapy instruments and nonverbal language, thereby 
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stimulating the support and elaboration of the “thinking functions" ([20], pp. 61–79) “on the 
edge" of the team. These narratives are reported in the context of the work team, with the 
supervision of the psychologist, to discuss the suitability of PST.
2. Clinical cases
2.1. Albert
An anonymous patient referred to as “Albert” was a 56-year-old male, married with a young 
daughter and an adopted adult child from a previous marriage. He was described by friends 
as a brilliant, educated, and intelligent man who was a consummate reader. His wife told 
us that he referred to himself as rational and lacking affection, unable to handle emotions, 
with cultivated areas of rewarding personal interest not shared with his family. He was well 
informed of his terminally illness (a progression of prostatic cancer with secondary bone 
lesions) and was admitted to hospice after an episode of major depression and a suicide 
attempt.
At the time of admission, the patient had urinary incontinence, the inability to walk and 
postural instability. He became dependent for all daily activities. The patient was extremely 
anxious and frightened by the pain, as well as feeling like a burden to his family and losing 
control of his own autonomy. He said that he was worried that when he died, his wife would 
not be able to provide for his daughter "as she should."
We started specific therapy to address his pain and antidepressants, with some initial benefit. 
However, the episodes of pain occurred more frequently, as did his anxiety, despite changes 
to the therapy (Figure 1).
The patient was in despair, and he wished to die. Facing refractory pain and anguish, we 
spoke with him about “conscious” or mild palliative sedation and the option of receiv-
ing additional doses of sedatives (intermittent sedation) when he desired to sleep. This 
proposal seemed to reassure him, perhaps returning to the patient the opportunity to 
regain some control by managing his symptoms. His wife took part in this conversation. 
She remained still and silent, sitting in the middle of a chair away from her husband's 
bed. Outside the room, she told us that the patient had repeatedly asked for euthanasia 
and that she disagreed with the mild or conscious sedation, as this option would not 
have protected her husband from the awareness of death. Confronted with oscillating 
sedation, in which the patient retained moments of awareness or reacted to surrounding 
stimuli, she showed apprehension and insisted that the sedation should be continuous 
and deep.
The patient spent nearly 20 days starting to again read and receive friends. He ate with an 
appetite and agreed to mobilize in a wheelchair, even going out for small trips. To the staff, he 
seemed to be sensitive and empathetic; however, his behavior with his wife seemed distant 
and not affectionate. I met him every day for visits with conversations about his tales of life. 
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Recovery days Symptoms Drugs (dosage/day) Follow-up
Prehospitalization Major depression Duloxetine 60 mg Antidepressant 
therapy was not 
changed until the week 
before his death
Olanzapine 15 mg (in three 
divided doses)
Alprazolam 0.75 mg (in three 
divided doses)
Neuropathic pain from spinal 
metastases
Naropin 150 mg + Morphine 
hydrochloride 6 mg for 
peridural by elastomeric 
infusion device
Necessary 
amendments to pain 
killers
Naropin peridural  bolus 5 mg 
as needed
Transmucosal fentanyl 
(tm) 400 μg need to be 
administered
Morphine hydrochloride 
10 mg for subcutaneously 
injection)
First 3 days Neuropathic pain
Numerical Rating Scale (NRS) 6/7
More than three episodes/day with 
NRS > 8
Naropin 150 mg + Morphine 
hydrochloride 6 mg for 
peridural by elastomeric 
infusion device
Episodes of intense 
pain; effectively 
addressed by 
parenteral morphine 
(NRS from 10 to 4)
Changes in sensation 
and voluntary 
movement of the lower 
limbs
More than 800 micr Fentanyl 
tm
At least 10 mg Morphine 
hydrochloride for 
subcutaneous injection
At least 20 mg of Naropin for 
peridural catheter divided into 
four boluses
Crisis of anxiety associated with 
pain, insomnia, and agitation
Midazolam 10 mg for 
subcutaneous injection as 
needed (at least two doses 
during the night)
When awake thoughts 
are fixed on the pain 
with an anticipatory 
anxious attitude
From 4 to 24 days Neuropathic pain
Side effects of an overdose of 
anesthetic via epidural
The patient spoke of problems in 
life and expressed a wish to die; 
returning to thoughts of suicide
Asked to be euthanized
Faced the possibility of a palliative 
sedation with the addition of a 
benzodiazepine (Midazolam) by 
continuous infusion at doses that do 
not induce awareness reduction
Patient managed his sedation “on 
demand”
Added dexamethasone 8 mg 
for intravenous infusion
The patient returned 
to reading, receiving 
friends, resting all 
night, eating at the 
table, and walking 
about the room
Pain control requires 
periodic adjustments of 
doses of intravenously 
infused drugs
Elastomer suspended by 
epidural; small amount of 
naropine by epidural (from 
150 to 80 mg) with four 
boluses of 20 mg every 12 h 
during the day
Elastomer device intravenous 
(Morphine hydrochloride 
50 mg + 15 mg Midazolam)
Midazolam 20 mg in 250 ml 
saline at 20 ml/hour for 
hypnotic purposes
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Once, we used expressive therapy to represent his emotions and thoughts. I invited his wife 
to stay, but she preferred to leave.
I felt discomfort between the couple, although I did not understand why. I think that his 
wife left out of respect for his privacy perhaps as she used to. Albert insinuated that his wife 
did not want to participate because he had always demonstrated little emotion with her. He 
seemed sorry for this situation, and I thought that there was a sense of unworthiness and 
mortification, as it had appeared after the interview with the psychologist.
We drew on the same sheet, just like playing chess, his favorite game. We noted the difference 
in our traces. His was rigorous and linear, crossing the sheet directly. My trace ran under his 
and sometimes outlined a colorful space.
He said: “It’s wonderful that you colour inside my lines.” He found that one of the colored 
spaces seemed like Fonzie’s hair tuft. We joked about this because Albert was left bald after 
chemotherapy. I thought that an element of narcissistic gratification could have been present. 
Despite the tone, the dialogue was lighter and less desperate. Albert talked about his own death 
and his wish to die (WTD). To end was no longer seen as an affront or undignified, and he no 
longer experienced the loss of control in making decisions. He would have shown his family 
how one can die, as a way of instructing them and giving them time to deal with the loss.
By the 18th day of hospitalization, Albert reported proprioceptive changes before waking up 
(e.g., one leg was larger than the other, his mouth was smaller, or one-half of the body slid 
diagonally in space). He spoke about these phenomena as an attentive witness. He understood 
Recovery days Symptoms Drugs (dosage/day) Follow-up
From 24 to 33 days Leakage of the epidural catheter and 
accentuation of pain
Neurological side effects increasing 
opioid and benzodiazepine 
(concentration deficits, ideomotor 
slowdown, and impairment of 
concentration)
Increased dosage of morphine 
hydrochloride in 90 and 60 mg 
of midazolam in elastomeric 
device intravenous
Ideomotor slowdown 
with lucid and 
coherent; ataxia with 
postural instability in 
standing position. Able 
to receive visits, talk, 
listen to music but finds 
it impossible to read
A week before death 
reported having seen 
Out of body experience
Dexamethasone was reduced 
from 8 to 4 mg
From 34 to 39 days Total pain with a prevalence of 
existential pain
Reported desperation because the 
contact with reality was slipping
The patient was reassured not to be 
afraid of his dreams and imagination
In the end, we proposed a 
continuous sedation
Morphine hydrochloride 
120 mg and midazolam 90 
and 100 mg chlorpromazine 
into elastomer device 
intravenously
Sedation oscillated 
at times the patient 
responds to verbal 
stimuli or to the 
presence of people, 
and when he awakens 
takes water and/or 
semi-soft food
Refers to hearing death 
approaching
Haloperidol 6 mg divided into 
three doses
Figure 1.
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his detachment from reality as a sign of impending death. The patient did not ask for a reduc-
tion of consciousness, even when he was in despair. Despite oscillating between drowsiness 
and wakefulness, he retained an awareness of death and dying until a few days before his 
death, when continued palliative sedation was initiated at his request. After Albert’s death, I 
talked with his wife once again to ask permission to report this story. On that occasion, I had 
the opportunity to make my unease at the request for euthanasia known to her and told her 
that the mild and respite sedation had given Albert an opportunity to be together with his 
family and friends. Laconically, turning her head slightly sideways and with a smile she said 
something that I do not remember exactly but it could sound something like, "I would have 
preferred euthanasia."
2.2. Discussion of Albert’s case
In this case, the care team is involved in different perspectives.
From the psychological point of view, the care team felt a sense of inadequacy and impotence 
toward the patient’s wife, who insistently demanded deep sedation. Health workers were 
conflicted by the emotional pressure of his wife’s, although the pharmacological treatment 
had ameliorated the quality of life of the patient, that started to eat, to receive friends, to read 
again and he agreed to mobilize in a wheelchair, with a sort of resilience, nonetheless in a 
difficult condition. Albert talked about his own death and his wish to die in a way less desper-
ately. It seemed to emerge a new significance of his death, with a sort of project brought out: 
he would have shown his family how one could die, as a way of instructing them and giving 
them time to deal with the loss. The care team felt inspired from image behind the expression 
“You colour inside my lines” that Albert said at the end of expressive encounter with artistic 
material supporting the verbal dialogue. Albert manifested a capacity to be ironic about the 
changes of body image that is intrinsically linked to identity and the meaning of dignity [21]. 
Through the pharmacological treatment, the attention and the listening, the care team had 
returned to Albert the control of his end-of-life decision, prevented by burdening of symp-
tom’s disease and psychological distress.
The care team struggled with the request of euthanasia; therefore, the second point of analysis 
has been from this perspective. Albert represented cases in which a wish to die (WTD) persists 
even if pain is treated in a palliative care model [22]. A desire to hasten death is associated with 
functional impairment related to pain, and, moreover, it is a measure of pain severity in some 
studies [23]. Therefore, the significant decline in pain intensity levels was not predictive of an 
improvement in the desire to hasten death, particularly in patients in the last days of life, for 
whom other symptoms may also be associated with psychological distress, such as depres-
sion with insecure attachment, low self-esteem, and younger age [24]. Probably for these rea-
sons, the patient’s wife insisted with the therapy addressed to the abolition of consciousness 
(instead of the euthanasia, not legally performed in Italy). The care team, in line with the 
emotions and embarrassment expressed in the narrative explicit above and experienced by the 
physician in the encounters with the patient, referred the sense of unworthiness and mortifica-
tion felt in the room when the wife was into a low self-esteem relationship or to reactualization 
in the couple of an insecure attachment. We have no other data on past to support this analysis, 
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but the possibility “to colour the lines inside of mine,” recalled a new chance for Albert to experi-
ence himself in the relationship with the care team, instead of a crystallized, fixed and “black 
and white” defenses.
After all, WTD is a complex subjective and social phenomenon, a process rather than a mental 
state, in which it is important to explore not only the reasons or triggering factors, which can 
be treated, but also how a WTD makes sense for the patients [25]. Caregivers have a great 
responsibility because the WTD can be influenced by conversations about them. Then, to 
cultivate the skill of active listening, to reflect on their own ideas and fears about death, and to 
facilitate the patient’s inner dialogue and discussion of his/her wishes about life and dying are 
the tasks required to assist patients in formulating their connection to their personal values 
and perspectives [26].
At this point, the care team had clarified that the request of the patient’s wife could not be 
accepted as a surrogate decision, and the woman must be helped to tolerate the process of 
awareness of patient in front of his death. Nevertheless, the care team needed to tolerate the 
insistent demand of the wife, highlighting the ability of Albert to be the main interlocutor of 
end-of-life decisions and understanding that the psychological pressure experienced by the 
care team (that is the result of a projective identification) was attuned with the anxiety of the 
woman overwhelmed by the proximity of the death (in the context of the psychological and 
relational dynamics experienced in the couple, understood only partially). The PST could be 
the best chance, but the way and the time should be arranged with the patient.
Now we face with the third perspective of analysis. How should we interpret the propriocep-
tive impairment that occurred near the death? Was it a sign of delirium? If this hypothesis was 
correct, how we should consider the patient, competent or not competent?
The patient had, as we have shown in Figure 1, a complex drug therapy and a high-dose of 
neuroleptic drugs. There are insufficient clinical studies that allow one to clearly determine 
whether certain patient expressions that could be considered bizarre or incoherent are attrib-
utable to drugs with known neurological side effects or to impairment of thought function 
(e.g., delirium at the end of life) or whether they belong to a degree of consciousness that is 
part of the process of preparing for death.
The recent information available on proprioception suggests the role of small-diameter sen-
sory cortical fibers representing each body part. For example, immediate distortion of body 
size with local anesthesia has been linked to loss of input from small-diameter fibers [27]. 
Findings in cardiac arrest survivors suggest that central hypercapnia and peripheral hypoxia, 
secondary to cerebral ischemia, cause a cortical hyper-activation that helps to explain the 
phenomenon of increased awareness in these patients in the absence of cerebral activity [28]. 
On the other hand, the cerebral ischemia is responsible for metabolic alterations also involved 
in nociceptive synaptic transmission, such as the inhibition of the production of nitric oxide, 
a free radical that regulates the cerebral phenomena of apoptosis. It would seem that it was 
implicated in the long-term potentiation (LTP), which supports the reinforcement of the syn-
aptic transmission of spinal neurons and in fact represents an expression of a memory of the 
nociceptive stimuli [29, 30]. It is also known that pharmacological interventions can change 
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the function of nociceptive neurons by transforming them into broad spectrum neurons of 
potential action (wide dynamic range or WDR) that receive impulses not only from the noci-
ceptive system but also through the sense of touch and heat, which leads one to assume a link 
between nociception and proprioception, particularly in situations of peripheral or central 
hypersensitivity [31].
Therefore, the care team pointed out some questions: this phenomenon should be understood 
in the contest of the peripheral desensitization induced by drugs that act on mu receptors 
and GABA receptors (such as the association opioids and benzodiazepines) or as a cortical 
hyperactivation that occurs in the phenomena of near-death experience? Was it possible that 
Morphine and Midazolam hydrochloride in high doses act like a block anesthetic causing 
distortions in body size (like the proprioceptive alteration of Albert)? What was the relation-
ship between the cortical areas of expansion representing the body parts and more complex 
alteration of body image in people who are dying taking neuroleptic drugs?
Thus, it was difficult to conclude whether the described phenomenon of depersonalization 
could be understood in the context of existential distress or if it has been caused by a pharma-
cological effect or a more complex alteration of body image in people who are dying. Some 
authors believe that the process of dying may consist of the translation of a progressive with-
drawal of psychic energy in the neurological and peripheral nervous systems [32, 33]. The 
importance of defining this phenomenon was related to determining a strategy to treat it 
(pharmacological treatment up to palliative terminal sedation, or other approaches as psy-
chotherapy, touch therapy, etc.).
Eventually, we regarded to this proprioceptive impairment like a sign of the disorder of the 
“body-container” [34] that could be a cause of anguish and could also explain the manifes-
tation of proprioceptive reactions that often occur in a seriously ill patient [35]. Clinging to 
objects, fear during passive mobilization in bed, increased muscle tension, motor restlessness 
secondary to the loss of bowel control or failure to deplete the elimination organs such as 
the bladder and rectum, and the lack of perception of body parts could be an expression of 
primitive anguish. In the case of Albert, changes in proprioception had been integrated with 
vestibular afferents and condensed in the content of "dream-thought" in the form of imagina-
tion, visions, and hallucinations. Although drugs administered may account for a cognitive 
dysfunction, it is interesting to note that hallucinations were concomitant to the general decay 
of the patient and were present close to death after a relatively long period of therapy, which 
still ensured a good quality of life. What was interesting in this case was that the presumed 
hallucinations of the patient were only of a kinesthetic nature, and this aspect was contextual-
ized in the attitude of a person with difficulties making body contact.
We considered Albert competent and aware of the death impending, therefore we accepted 
his ability to let us known the proper time to start unconsciousness sedation.
2.3. Edy
Edy was an anonymous name for a 73-year-old married woman, with two sons and a husband. 
She suffered from dilated cardiomyopathy. For many years, Edy faced her cancer diagnosis 
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and chemotherapy with a type of awareness that was obscured by an unjustified expectation 
of healing. Cancer of the rectum was already in an advanced stage, with liver metastases 
and infiltration of the uterus—at the time of diagnosis, 6 years to our knowledge. Edy had 
faced surgery and chemotherapy, apparently delegating her husband to receive information 
about the evolution of the clinical oncology. In fact, Edy unconsciously led her husband to 
believe what she wanted to believe, thereby causing him to downplay or cast doubt on the 
information received. Her husband had some type of dissociation from the information that 
he received. He seemed to be aware, though he had an emotional reaction of denial or devalu-
ation (the same reaction demonstrated by his wife). Therefore, in terms of communication, the 
couple seemed to function as a unique individual.
Within a year, there were sub-occlusive symptoms, with two hospitalizations for nau-
sea, vomiting, and lack of canalization of the intestine, which appeared to show peritoneal 
carcinomatosis.
We met Edy at her home, after she had started palliative home care on the advice of her 
oncologist, who intended to reduce hospital admissions for clinical symptoms by utilizing 
only symptomatic treatment. The husband was visibly fatigued and short of breath, but he 
was bustling around his wife and received us in the living room.
The logistical setting did not seem to function well for their needs. The bedroom was likely 
located on the top floor of the house, which was accessed through a staircase, with no hand-
rail. In the room, there were two leather sofas. It resembled a showroom (visible but not 
touchable). The husband offered us two chairs in front of Edy, who was sitting at the dining 
table. The chairs were solid wood and uncomfortable. It was difficult to imagine that Edy 
could remain sitting there for very long. The conversation was dry. The symptoms that we 
were supposed to be treating were discussed openly, but we were warned that many good, 
reliable doctors (whose advice, we thought, could not be discussed) were attending to the 
family, including the family doctor, physical therapist, and cardiologist (who treated Edy’s 
husband, as well as Edy’s atrial fibrillation). Indeed, it seemed that only the cardiological 
therapy was the most important, because it was "life-saving." The examination of the patient 
did not indicate an acute phase diagnosis, although there was diarrhea indicative of a sub-
occlusion, but the treatments that we had prescribed were stopped by the patient with advice 
of her family, as soon as we left the house.
A few days later, we received a phone call notifying us that the patient had been admitted to 
Oncology Department again. Another 15 days passed, and the patient was then transferred to 
hospice. Edy then appeared to be depressed and tired; however, her sons insisted on moving 
their mother to an armchair. When Edy refused food, they urged her to eat. Edy's husband 
was taciturn and present only when one of the sons was with him; he never asked us for infor-
mation, and sometimes, he did not visit his wife for an entire day. Edy seemed to have chosen 
him as the subject toward whom to express her anger.
She also showed a certain level of contempt toward us. She snapped bitterly at the health work-
ers who helped her with her basic needs. With her husband, she would let loose. However, 
this behavior did not seem to disturb the family.
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There was a tendency to "normalize" everything in the family and not interpret Edy’s 
unfriendly and rejecting manners as an aspect of her anger and mortification.
Her adult children refused to accept the recommended psychological support. However, it 
finally emerged through the sons that there was a possibility that Edy felt betrayed by her 
family because they had given up on bringing her home. This admission in hospice provided 
a way for Edy of dealing with topics, such as disappointment, the rupture that she sensed 
with the world, and the likelihood that her autonomy was irretrievably lost.
We had already prescribed antidepressants. We were witnesses to not only the physical decay 
of her body but also a particular manner of rejecting the world and preparing for death, which 
was also a source of anxiety for the team.
Edy became silent, without conditions or compromises. We tried various relational approaches, 
but there was no longer a productive relationship for an alliance with the patient regarding 
her decisions and desires. We tried to talk to her about the possibility of using a sedative type 
rescue dose, to discontinue the “passive” waking moments, but the patient, with her eyes 
closed, denied us even eye contact, saying, "I sleep enough already." We felt cornered, closed 
in and somehow gagged. When performing hygienic care in the morning, providing treat-
ment or administering medication, some of the team members felt crushed by the silence and 
the passivity of the patient. The health care professionals were competing to stimulate or to 
induce Edy to answer merely yes or no.
We seemed to have become lost in the same trap that her sons were in: trying to please her, to 
stimulate her, or to talk to her in the belief that she could hear. It was strange that in front of 
her motionless body and her calm breathing, as if sleeping, with her muscle tone flabby from 
passive mobilization, that no one would think that she might have been in a state of coma. 
Everyone continued in the belief that she could understand what we were saying but that she 
wanted to punish us with her silence. We examined her again, excluding a state of coma. The 
feelings of alienation, depersonalization, and derealization that we felt when facing Edy not 
only excluded us from her world but also effaced us. From this perspective, we understood 
the reactions of the family members when faced with the proposal of respite sedation: "No, 
because it would extinguish her completely."
Clearly, it was a fact with which we did not agree; however, we could not overlook it. We 
did not have the support of the patient or her family members. In some last words spoken 
by Edy in the 15 days before her death, she told a nurse, "Here I am committing suicide." The 
tense used in the sentence referred to an action that was in progress, so the nurse thought she 
was dreaming in real time. However, following questions by the nurse, Edy replied, “I'm not 
dreaming, it is precisely what is happening; see, I’m committing suicide.”
2.4. Discussion of Edy’s case
In this case, the burden on the family in end-of-life decisions is clear, as was how little attention 
is still given to the process of awareness of the disease and poor prognosis before arriving at 
the point of palliative care [36]. The demand for information is not uniform in our society, and 
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the role played by the families of terminally patients and in the attitude of physicians toward 
information disclosure clearly differs from the Northern European or Anglo-Saxon model 
[37]. Sometimes, the problem is how to inform a patient who is not willing to be informed. The 
culturally established modus operandi obliges the health care professional to be discrete when 
discussing cancer [38]. Moreover, the patient is free to use their autonomy even to delegate. 
The patient must decide how much autonomy he or she wishes to exercise, and this amount 
likely varies from culture to culture. In addition, many families are opposed to inform the 
patients of their conditions [39] as demonstrated by the second case, such cases can evolve and 
become difficult to treat. It is obvious that these are situations in which the team feels guilty 
about a shortcoming, something that could have been done or that they were not doing. As 
care providers, we are not satisfied with these cases, but we have to accept that this individual 
had long eluded her diagnosis and had experienced the disease as if it concerned another per-
son, forcing those around her to feel that her anger was directed precisely toward herself, and 
she wanted the world to experience a sense of guilt. It may be possible that in cases in which a 
person is alienated from the awareness of death, there must be an extreme effort of self-denial 
and self-punishment to break away from the body, as in the case of Edy. In addition, in the 
conflict between family and care providers, palliative sedation for existential distress, even if 
appropriate, could not have been of benefit because it could cause further distress. Therefore, 
the dramatic sentence repeated to the nurse by Edy “I’m committing suicide” talks about not 
an intention but probably resumed the psychic dynamics in the relational field.
With her mutism, Edy elicited in the caregivers (care team and family) a feeling of impotence; 
with the refuse to eat elicited a sense of guilty; when she was acting out a state of coma, care-
givers thought that she could understand what we were saying but that she wanted to punish 
us with her silence. With this passive attitude, the care team was obliged to feel her alienation 
and depersonalization. But like her family, the care team did not understand this powerful 
mechanism of psychic contamination; in front of anger, fear, and anguish of the patient, it 
could not find a way to deal with the subject of the imminent death and so doing, was allied 
to the defense mechanisms of the family (untruth, avoidance, and the complaisance, trying to 
please her or to stimulate her).
The care team countertransference seemed to be that it was expressed by the family when 
PST was proposed “the feeling that the doctors killed a loved one.” The sentence of Edy about 
committing suicide reverses the roles, attributing to herself the damaging action (that caregiv-
ers attribute to themselves). In this sentence, Edy became in certain way assertive again and 
self-determined (in the sentences she is able to act), while the care team, with regret, could 
see mirrored its inability to propose their active role (the dialogue for truth, the support to the 
patient’s role in end-of-life decision).
3. Conclusion
Sometimes troubled relationships that are full of emotions will short-circuit between the patient, 
family, and care team when they are inexorably facing the possibility of death and, sometimes, 
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sudden death, during the process of a rapidly advancing, progressive, serious illness. The knowl-
edge of some powerful mechanisms of communication, such as projective identifications, can 
explain the intensity of emotional involvement and the difficulty in making important decisions. 
Knowledge of this mechanism can become an instrument (as in psychodynamic psychotherapy 
and psychoanalysis) to understand what happens to a person who is living an end-of-life experi-
ence and to help health care professionals tolerate conflicts that overshadow important clinical 
decisions. In such cases, the guidelines that establish the decision-making process in these areas 
of care, although useful, are not sufficient to guide choices and decisions shared between the team 
and family. Both cases are suitable for PST, but in the first case, the problem was tolerating the 
wife’s requests for deep sedation, which did not align with the patient’s dissociative phenomena 
and persistent WTD; in the second case, the PST that seemed to be appropriate (because of the 
existential distress that was strongly expressed) was not achieved due to the family conflicts and 
poor auto-determination of the patient, who was not cognitively impaired. The care team, who 
had to share and develop intense feelings of frustration and doubt, also had to, at minimum, not 
surrender to an analysis based on “what you already know.” It is known that in care team, this 
psychological pressure might result in physicians acting inappropriately [40, 41] before consider-
ing the need to understand the meaning of what is being observed. We agree that more training 
needs to be provided to physicians and palliative care teams [42].
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